Exploring 'The autisms' at a cognitive level by Cantio, C et al.
Running head: EXPLORING ’THE AUTISMS’ AT A COGNITIVE LEVEL 1 
In press in Autism Research: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/aur.1630 
 
Exploring ‘The Autisms’ at a Cognitive Level 
Running title: Exploring ‘The Autisms’ at a Cognitive Level 
 
Cathriona Cantio, Cand.psych. (1, 2), Jens Richardt Møllegaard Jepsen, MSc., PhD (3, 4), 
Gitte Falcher Madsen, MD, PhD (1), Niels Bilenberg, Professor, MD, PhD (1, 2), and Sarah 
White, PhD (5) 
(1) Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Department, Odense, Mental Health Services, 
Southern Denmark 
(2) Institute of Clinical Research, University of Southern Denmark 
(3) Centre for Neuropsychiatric Schizophrenia Research & Centre for Clinical 
Intervention and Neuropsychiatric Schizophrenia Research, Copenhagen University 
Hospital, Psychiatric Hospital Centre Glostrup, Denmark 
(4) Child and Adolescent Mental Health Centre, Mental Health Services Capital Region 
of Denmark, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark  
(5) Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK 
Corresponding authors contact information 
Cathriona Cantio, Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Department, Odense, Sdr. Boulevard 29, 
5000 Odense C, Denmark, Tel.: +45 24658731, Email: cathriona.cantio@rsyd.dk 
 
Grant information 
This study was supported by Grant sponsor: The Psychiatric Research Foundation in the 
Region of Southern Denmark, Grant sponsor: The PhD grant in Region of Southern Denmark 
and Grant sponsor: Sofiefonden
EXPLORING ”THE AUTISMS” AT A COGNITIVE LEVEL 2 
 
Lay abstract (229/250 words) 
The autism spectrum is full of variation both in terms of the range of symptoms and 
differences between individuals. Even so, it is possible that a single cause might be present 
underneath this diversity in all individuals with autism. This study focussed on three well-
known cognitive differences that are thought to affect the way people with autism process 
information: Theory of Mind (ToM), Executive Function (EF) and a Local Processing Bias 
(LB). 31 high-functioning children with ASD and 37 neurotypically-developing children of 
similar age, gender and intelligence completed several tasks within each cognitive domain. 
Everyday behaviours were also assessed through parent and teacher questionnaires, parent 
interview and direct observation. We found that ToM and EF difficulties were common and 
performance on these tasks could be used to accurately divide most of the children into those 
with and without ASD. Performance on these tasks was related to each other but not to any of 
the everyday behaviours. Only a small group of individuals with ASD had an LB, which 
didn’t relate to the other measures; an LB may be the cause of symptoms that weren’t 
included in an ASD diagnosis. Future studies may reinforce the idea that there is a single 
cause of autism in all affected individuals. 
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Scientific abstract 
The autism spectrum is characterised by genetic and behavioural heterogeneity. However, it 
is still unknown whether there is a universal pattern of cognitive impairment in autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) and whether multiple cognitive impairments are needed to explain 
the full range of behavioural symptoms. This study aimed to determine whether three widely 
acknowledged cognitive abnormalities (Theory of Mind (ToM) impairment, Executive 
Function (EF) impairment and the presence of a Local Processing Bias (LB)) are universal 
and fractionable in autism, and whether the relationship between cognition and behaviour is 
dependent on the method of behavioural assessment. 31 high-functioning children with ASD 
and 37 neurotypically-developing (NTD) children, comparable in age, gender and IQ, 
completed several tasks within each cognitive domain, and autistic symptomatology was 
assessed through parental and teacher questionnaires, parental interview and direct 
observation. We found that ToM and EF deficits differentiated the groups, were related to 
each other and were together able to correctly classify more than three-quarters of the 
children into cases and controls, despite relating to none of the specific behavioural measures. 
Only a small subgroup of individuals displayed an LB, which was unrelated to ToM and EF, 
and did not aid diagnostic classification, most likely contributing to non-diagnostic symptoms 
in a subgroup. Despite the characteristic heterogeneity of the autism spectrum, it remains a 
possibility therefore that a single cognitive cause may underlie the range of diagnostic 
symptoms in all individuals with autism. 
 
Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorders, Cognition, Theory of Mind, Executive Function, 
Local Bias, Fractionation, Symptomatology, and Behaviour 
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Exploring ‘The Autisms’ at a Cognitive Level 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is now widely accepted to be a neurodevelopmental 
disorder with a genetic basis resulting in atypical development of the brain, although 
relatively little is known about the exact genetic or biological abnormalities underlying the 
disorder (Betancur, 2011; Gliga, Jones, Bedford, Charman, & Johnson, 2014; Goldani, 
Downs, Widjaja, Lawton, & Hendren, 2014; Happe & Ronald, 2008; Lai, Lombardo, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2013). An ASD-diagnosis therefore relies upon a defined set of behavioural 
criteria, encompassing social interaction and communication difficulties and the presence of 
repetitive behaviours (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). A behavioural 
diagnosis has the disadvantage of heterogeneity: there can be many different causes of the 
same behaviour, or equally, different behaviours in different individuals can result from the 
same underlying cause due to interaction with other factors (Rutter, 2000). Indeed, the 
shopping list-style diagnostic criteria (Morton, 2008) now expect and furthermore embrace 
behavioural heterogeneity, leading the term ‘the autisms’ (Geschwind & Levitt, 2007) to 
enter the literature. 
While it is acknowledged that different individuals vary wildly in their personal 
presentation of this shared diagnostic label (Geschwind, 2009; Munson, Faja, Meltzoff, 
Abbott, & Dawson, 2008; Ronald, Happe, Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin, 2006), this same 
heterogeneity is much harder to reconcile at a causal level of explanation. Still, heterogeneity 
is clearly evident at the genetic level: a host of rare genetic mutations have been identified 
but are thought to account for only 10-20% of autism cases (Abrahams & Geschwind, 2008), 
whilst genetic modelling indicates that autism is likely to result from 400-1000 risk genes 
interacting in complex ways (O'Roak et al., 2012). This has led the field to pursue 
endophenotypic markers that can homogeneously draw subgroups of individuals together 
(Charman et al., 2007) and heterogeneity certainly appears to decrease as we travel down the 
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causal chain from genetics to cognition. There is convergence from genetics to neurobiology, 
with evidence focussing around synaptic function (Zoghbi, 2003) and neural connectivity 
(Geschwind & Levitt, 2007); further convergence from cellular to systems neuroscience is 
apparent, with most emphasis placed on the frontal lobes, amygdala and cerebellum (Amaral, 
Schumann, & Nordahl, 2008). Whilst theories abound at the cognitive level, Theory of Mind 
(ToM), executive function (EF) and a local processing bias (LB) remain the most prominent 
(Brunsdon & Happe, 2014; Frith, 2012; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007) drawing together 
diverse biological and behavioural findings. 
It has thus been suggested that there may not be a unitary underlying cause of autism at 
any level and that leaving the “single explanation” approach behind may indeed be the key to 
identifying the genetic and neurocognitive origins of autism (Happe, Ronald, & Plomin, 
2006); instead, it seems likely that a number of different mechanisms are required to explain 
different aspects of autistic symptomatology (Happe & Ronald, 2008). While such 
fractionation is evident at the behavioural level, it is still unclear whether the different 
proposed cognitive impairments in autism are similarly separable (Brunsdon & Happe, 
2014); very few studies have examined ToM, EF and LB simultaneously in ASD and these 
findings have been contradictory (Brunsdon et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2012; Lam, 2013; 
Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006). Furthermore, only one of these studies 
(Pellicano et al., 2006) has examined the relationship between cognition and 
symptomatology, finding no associations, and hence it is unknown whether these cognitive 
impairments really can explain independent aspects of autistic behaviour. One as yet 
unexplored possibility is that the detection of such relationships may be dependent on the tool 
used to evaluate diagnostic symptoms, whether assessed through parent or teacher report, 
through interview or direct observation. The present study therefore aims to provide further 
evidence to inform the fractionation debate at the cognitive and behavioural levels. 
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The idea of fractionating autism addresses the observation that there is no mechanism 
at any level of causality that is sufficient to explain the totality of the autistic syndrome. Inter-
individual heterogeneity addresses a subtly different issue: whether there is any causal 
mechanism common to all individuals, a notion that is also widely presumed to be true but 
which has received much less empirical attention (Brunsdon & Happe, 2014). In fact, inter-
individual heterogeneity has even been suggested to be a more distinct marker for autism 
than any one neuropathology (Towgood, Meuwese, Gilbert, Turner, & Burgess, 2009), 
attempting to explain why one study may find support for and the next find no evidence in 
favour of a particular underlying deficit. It remains an open question whether there is a 
universal pattern of impairment that can draw together all individuals with autism, or whether 
there is truth in the term ‘the autisms’ not just at a behavioural level but also at a causal level 
of explanation. The present study aims to address this issue. 
This study therefore attempts to shed light on the following:  
1) Are the cognitive impairments ToM, EF and LB fractionable in ASD? 
2) Are any of these cognitive impairments common to all individuals with ASD? 
3) Do these cognitive impairments predict autistic symptomatology? 
4) Is the relationship between cognition and behaviour dependent on the method of 
behavioural assessment? 
 
Method 
We examined all three cognitive domains (ToM, EF and LB) in a large group of high-
functioning children with ASD as well as a group of neurotypically-developing (NTD) 
children, comparable in age, gender and IQ. We used several tasks within each domain to 
ensure the validity of the cognitive measures and, given the propensity in the literature for 
high-functioning individuals with ASD to pass such tests, we selected tasks that have 
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previously been found to be sensitive. In addition, the children were comprehensively 
assessed with widely used instruments of autistic symptomatology, including parental and 
teacher questionnaires, parental interview and direct observation.  
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Region of Southern Denmark 
(S-20090071). 
Participants 
The ASD group was recruited from two Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 
in the Region of Southern Denmark by searching the Patient Administrative System for date 
of birth (8-12 year olds) and ICD-10 diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental Disorder (F84.0-
84.9). The diagnostic files were reviewed and children who did not fulfil an ASD-diagnosis 
or had a full-scale IQ (FSIQ) below 70 were excluded. A total of 82 clinically diagnosed 
children with ASD were invited to participate in the study, of which 54 families responded, 
from which 37 children agreed to participate. Three additional cases were recruited from 
special education schools for children with ASD.  
Participants in the ASD group were only included if they also met DSM-IV-TR criteria 
for an ASD at the time of the assessment. An individual clinical conference of trained 
clinicians included all previous diagnostic information in conjunction with current scores on 
the ADOS and ADI-R (see below), and formed the basis for the confirmation of diagnosis. At 
this stage, 11 children met the criteria for Autistic Disorder, 7 for Asperger’s Syndrome and 
17 for Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS). The 
remaining 5 children no longer fulfilled diagnostic criteria for an ASD and were excluded. 
Four further children were excluded due to current FSIQ below 70 leaving a total of 31 for 
analyses. FSIQ was estimated on the basis of three verbal and three performance subtests 
from the Danish translation of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, 
Wechsler, 2003).  
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The NTD children (N=37) were recruited from four different mainstream schools using 
similar inclusion criteria (FSIQ>70, age: 8-12 years). None of the NTD participants had 
elevated scores on the SRS or SCQ questionnaires (see below) or were otherwise reported or 
known to have any developmental disorder or family history of such difficulties. 
The groups did not significantly differ on gender (X2(1)=0.97), age (t(63)=0.32), 
performance IQ (t(66)=0.60) or verbal IQ (t(64)=1.48). The majority of children were 
Caucasian and from middle-class families, and we found no significant difference in their 
parents’ educational level (X2(1)=.29), defined by the highest ranking parent’s education 
(more/less than 13 years of education; see table 1).  
Behavioural assessment of symptoms 
For the ASD group, autistic symptomatology was measured using the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS, Lord et al., 2000) and Autism Diagnostic 
Interview, Revised (ADI-R, Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) in order to observe the child’s 
behaviour in a clinical setting and to assess parents’ perception of their children’s disabilities 
(see table 1). All children reached the cut-off in ADOS social interaction, but seven children 
fell below cut-off in communication, and six children did not reach the total cut-off for 
communication and social interaction. 
Symptomatology scores were recorded for both groups from parents and teachers using 
two different questionnaires: the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS, Constantino et al., 2003) 
and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ, formerly the Autism Screening 
Questionaire, Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles, & Bailey, 1999). Significant group differences 
were found on both questionnaires for parents (SRS, t(35)=11.734, p<0.001; SCQ, 
t(36)=9.926, p<0.001) and teachers (SRS, t(42)=9.570, p<0.001; SCQ, t(43)=4.710, 
p<0.001). Interestingly, parents in the ASD group tended to rate their children as having 
significantly more symptoms than the teachers did (SRS, t(27)=2.671, p=0.013; SCQ, 
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t(26)=2.076, p=0.048), whereas the opposite was true for the NTD group on the SCQ 
(t(22)=3.976, p=0.001; no difference on SRS, t(25)=0.609). 
Table 1 about here 
Instruments  
ToM tasks. To assess advanced ToM abilities, we used White et al.’s (2009) modified 
Strange Stories for children, including the 5 sets of 8 stories: mental state, human, animal, 
nature and unlinked. We randomized both the order of story sets and the order of the stories 
within each set. Each story was read aloud by the experimenter, who then scribed the child’s 
answers; these were later scored according to the criteria in White et al. (2009). 
The Frith-Happé Animations were also employed; as in Salter, Seigal, Claxton, 
Lawrence, and Skuse (2008), we included four ToM and four Goal-Directed (GD) 
animations. These were administered in the same order for every child with two practice 
trials from the control random animations, followed by the GD and ToM animations 
presented alternately. Children’s verbal responses to each animation were recorded and were 
later scored for intentionality and appropriateness according to Castelli et al. (2002). 
EF tasks. We included tests of generativity (Verbal Fluency; Pattern Meanings), as well as 
the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB, Cambridge 
Cognition, 1996) which taps into planning (Stockings of Cambridge, SOC), working memory 
(Spatial Span, SSP; Spatial Working Memory, SWM) and flexibility (Intra-Extra 
Dimensional Set Shift, IED). 
Generativity. Two Verbal Fluency tasks were used: letter and category fluency (Benton, 
1968). We asked participants to generate as many different words as possible in 60 seconds. 
In the letter condition, all words were required to start with an F, excluding proper nouns. In 
the category condition, children were required to state as many animal names as possible. We 
recorded the number of correct answers after removing doublets and incorrect answers.  
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For the Pattern Meanings task, we used six meaningless line drawings taken from 
(Wallach, 1965); the first picture was a practice item, where alternative suggestions were 
made by the investigator as an illustration. Children were allowed to return to previously 
viewed items and were encouraged to give as many responses as possible within the 90 
second time limit. Answers were scored for correct, repetitive, redundant, not useful, 
incorrect and unscorable answers, according to Bishop and Norbury (2005a). 
CANTAB. The CANTAB was administered according to the user manual: instructions were 
read aloud and the tasks were presented on a tablet computer.  
Planning. For the SOC task, the number of problems solved in the minimum number of 
moves, the initial thinking time and the subsequent thinking time were recorded. 
Working memory. For the SSP task, span length was recorded. For the SWM task, strategy 
scores and double errors were recorded on 4-, 6-, and 8-box problems. 
Flexibility. For the IED task, we were primarily interested in a participant’s ability to switch 
from intra- to extra-dimensional sets in line with previous IED studies (Edgin & Pennington, 
2005; Goldberg et al., 2005; Happe, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006; Hughes, Russell, & 
Robbins, 1994; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Yerys et al., 2009), hence we 
only report errors at stage 8 of this task (no group differences were detected at any other 
stage).  
LB tasks. We employed the Embedded Figures Test (EFT, Spreen, 1969), a version which 
has not previously been used to assess local bias in individuals with ASD (see White & 
Saldana, 2011 for a recent review; cf. Children's Embedded Figures Test, Witkin, 1971). The 
stimuli consisted of 16 small pictures presented in book form and participants were required 
to locate a small, simple figure hidden in a larger figure and draw a line around the simple 
figure. Children were given two points on each trial for correctly identifying the hidden 
figure within 10 seconds and one point if this was completed after the time limit.  
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The Hooper Visual Organization Test (HVOT, Hooper, 1983), required the participant 
to combine fragmented puzzle-like pieces in their head and tell the experimenter what it 
would make as a whole. We recorded the number of correct answers and the average time for 
correct answers. 
 
Results 
As IQ and age varied greatly in these samples and both measures correlated to the 
majority of task measures, we chose to calculate individual performance levels for each task 
independent of IQ and age. We entered data from the NTD group as the dependent variable in 
a regression with FSIQ and age as the predictor variables, the resulting regression equation 
was applied to the ASD group, and residuals were collected for both groups. These were 
converted to z-scores in relation to the NTD group’s mean and standard deviation and used in 
all further analyses. Deviant performance was defined as below the 5th centile of NTD group 
performance; to detect individuals in the ASD group with deviant performance on each 
measure, any NTD group outliers performing more than 1.65 standard deviations (SDs) 
below the NTD group mean were removed in order to obtain a better estimate of normal 
performance, regardless of NTD children who might have performed abnormally on any one 
task. The NTD group mean and SD were then recalculated and outliers were defined as those 
lying more than 1.65 new SDs below this new NTD group mean (White et al., 2006). 
Theory of Mind (ToM) 
The ASD group performed significantly worse than the NTD group on the mental state 
Strange Stories (t(44)=3.10, p=0.003). We did not find a significant difference between the 
groups on any other story type (ps>0.08). For the Frith-Happé Animations, we found 
significant group differences in both the appropriateness of the answers and intentionality in 
the ToM condition (t(50.7)=4.63 and t(51.3)=4.28, ps<0.001). The ASD group also gave less 
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appropriate answers in the GD condition (t(66)=3.39, p=0.001).  
We found positive correlations between the mental state Strange Stories and both of the 
ToM scores from the Frith-Happé Animations (r=0.326, p=0.007 & r=0.272, p=0.025), 
although these did not hold in the groups separately. Nevertheless, we combined each 
individual’s z-scores on these three ToM measures to create a total ToM performance score, 
first averaging the two Frith-Happé Animation ToM scores before averaging them with the 
Strange Stories mental state score. This ToM total score also revealed a significant group 
difference (t(43.2)=5.253, p<0.001) with the ASD group performing on average 2SDs below 
the NTD group mean (see figure 1). Scores can be seen to span the whole range of the NTD 
group performance but with an elongated tail of individuals performing particularly poorly; 
indeed, 58% of children in the ASD group fell below the 5th centile cut-off. 
Figure 1 about here 
Executive function (EF) 
For generativity we found a significant group difference on Verbal Fluency in both 
conditions (letter, t(65.7)=2.935, p=0.005; category, t(54.7)=2.358 p=0.022), and on Pattern 
Meanings in the total number of correct responses (t(63.3)=4.855, p<0.001), with the ASD 
group performing more poorly. On the CANTAB tests, we found no significant group 
difference on any of the sub-scores in the SOC task (min. moves, t(66)=1.107, p=0.272; 
initial thinking, t(66)=1.118, p=0.268; sub thinking, t(66)=0.060, p=0.952), in the SSP task 
(t(66)=0.252, p=0.802), in the SWM task (number of errors in each condition, t(66)<0.983, ps 
>0.33; strategy used, t(66)=0.691, p=0.492) or in the IED task (extra dimensional shift, 
t(66)=1.712, p=0.092).  
We found significant correlations between the letter condition in Verbal Fluency and 
the Pattern Meanings task (r=0.428, p<0.001), which held in the NTD (r=0.338, p=0.041) but 
not the ASD group (r=0.287, p=0.117). A total generativity score was calculated as the mean 
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of these three measures. Within the CANTAB, the SSP and the SWM tasks were correlated 
(r=0.293, p=0.015), which held in the ASD (r=0.517, p=0.003) but not the NTD group 
(r=0.088, p=0.606). A total mean CANTAB score was calculated, where each task was 
weighted equally. The total CANTAB and total generativity scores were then averaged to 
provide an EF total score.  
The ASD group performed on average just less than 1SD below the NTD group on this 
EF total score (t(66)=3.856, p<0.001; see figure 1). The overall distribution was quite 
striking, however; there was significant overlap in the range of scores in the two groups. 
While 29% of children fell below the 5th percentile cut-off, the majority (52%) fell between 
this cut-off and the NTD group mean.  
Local Bias (LB) 
There was a non-significant tendency for children in the ASD group to perform slightly 
better than the NTD group on the EFT (t=1.924, p=0.059). In the HVOT, we did not find a 
significant group difference on the time taken to complete each trial (t=1.585, p=0.118) or on 
the credit score (t=1.567, p=0.122). Although there were no correlations between the two LB 
tasks, we combined the scores to give an LB total score, which did not differ significantly 
between the groups (t=0.094, p=0.925). Low z-scores indicated a local bias (high EFT and 
low HVOT scores). In the LB domain, only 13% of the children in the ASD group showed a 
profile indicative of a local processing style, falling below the 5th percentile cut-off. 
Relationships between cognitive domains 
We found no correlations between the composite scores of the three cognitive domains. 
Within ToM, performance on the Frith-Happé Animations was correlated to the EF 
composite (r=0.343, p=0.004) and, within EF, generativity was correlated to the ToM total 
score (r=0.299, p=0.013). These correlations seemed to be driven by an association 
specifically between the generativity composite and performance on the ToM Frith-Happé 
EXPLORING ”THE AUTISMS” AT A COGNITIVE LEVEL 14 
 
Animations (r=0.446, p<0.001). These correlations generally did not hold in the groups 
separately, although there was a trend towards the latter association within the ASD group 
(r=0.309, p=0.090).  
Patterns of impairment in each individual were studied. While the majority of children 
had a ToM impairment only, Figure 2 shows that individuals exist with most possible 
combinations of impairment. Figure 3 shows some specific examples of such combinations, 
portraying individual profiles across these three domains. This reveals that, although rare, the 
less frequent combinations of impairment are not an artefact of the cut-off methodology used; 
children exist with significant impairment in the affected domains whilst having retained 
performance in the remaining domains. Figure 2 further reveals a proportion of children with 
ASD who appear to have no significant cognitive impairments on the tests used here; 16% of 
children fell into this category although none had positive z-scores across all three cognitive 
domains. 
Figures 2&3 about here 
Wilks’ discriminant function analysis was used to investigate which cognitive factors 
(ToM, LB or EF) were best able to predict group membership. Variables were entered and 
removed in a step-wise manner. ToM was the best discriminator, correctly classifying 74% of 
the children, and EF was found to significantly increase this discrimination to 79% 
(χ2(2)=36.90, Wilks’ lambda=0.57, p<0.001; see classification matrix in Table 2; this 
increased further to 81% when the ToM Animations score and the Generativity Composite 
were substituted). Misclassification occurred equally in both groups, indicative of false 
negatives and false positives. When entered alone, EF classified 67% correctly. LB was not 
found to significantly aid in discriminating the groups at all. 
Table 2 about here 
Relationships between cognition and symptomatology 
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Relationships between cognitive and behavioural variables were explored in the ASD 
group alone as ADOS and ADI scores were not available for the NTD group. The ToM and 
EF total scores were unrelated to scores on the ADI but the LB total score was negatively 
correlated to a subscale of the ADI communication domain (delay in spoken language 
without attempts to compensate through gestures, r=0.368, p=0.042), indicating that the 
presence of autism-related communication symptoms was associated with a local processing 
bias (this would not withstand correction for multiple comparisons however). Likewise, ToM 
and EF total scores were unrelated to ADOS scores but the LB total score was correlated with 
a subscale of the ADOS repetitive behaviour domain (stereotypical behaviours, r=0.398, 
p=0.027), indicating that the absence of autism-related stereotypical behaviour was 
associated with a local processing bias (this would not withstand correction for multiple 
comparisons). We found no correlations between any of the cognitive domains and SRS 
scores, not even on a subscale level; likewise on the SCQ total scores.  
 
Discussion 
This case control study aimed to determine whether the cognitive impairments ToM, 
EF and LB are fractionable, and whether any of them are common to all individuals with 
autism spectrum disorders. Furthermore, we aimed to investigate whether these cognitive 
impairments predict autistic symptomatology, and whether the relationship between 
cognition and behaviour is dependent on the method of behavioural assessment. 
We found that ToM and EF deficits differentiated those with ASD from neurotypically 
developing children at a group level and a proportion of individuals were characterised by 
each difficulty. In fact, these abilities together were able to correctly classify more than three-
quarters of children into cases and controls. Furthermore, these cognitive impairments 
appeared to be related to each other, suggesting a lack of fractionation between these 
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domains. On the other hand, we found little support for the presence of an LB in autism, with 
only a small subgroup of individuals affected. Performance in this domain was unrelated to 
ToM and EF, indicating fractionation and that this processing style may explain specific 
aspects of autistic symptomatology that are present only in a small subgroup. However, we 
found no evidence that performance on ToM and EF tasks predicted autistic symptomatology 
regardless of the method of behavioural assessment. 
Cognitive universality 
Our ToM results at a group level are consistent with other studies of autism (Abell, 
Happe, & Frith, 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Salter et al., 2008; White et al., 2009), including 
all those assessing performance across multiple cognitive domains (Brunsdon et al., 2014; 
Lai et al., 2012; Lam, 2013; Pellicano et al., 2006). Despite great diversity in the tasks and 
methods used, ToM is consistently found to be impaired. Further, we found here that 58% of 
children with autism performed within the bottom 5th centile of neurotypical performance, 
and that ToM alone was able to correctly classify 74% of children into the correct groups and 
hence predict diagnostic status. This indicates that the ToM impairment may be the most 
frequently-occurring, well-specified and robust impairment, as well as being clinically 
relevant. It is possible that with even more sensitive tests (e.g. Senju, Southgate, White, & 
Frith, 2009), a ToM impairment might well be a universal impairment in autism. 
Likewise, EF impairment also seems to be quite reliably identified across studies (for 
reviews, see: Hill, 2004; Russo et al., 2007), including in 4 out of 5 cross-domain studies (the 
present study included). There appears to be an attenuating effect across EF tasks however: 
only a proportion of tasks produce group differences in each study and there is variability in 
which tests give rise to group differences across studies (Russo et al., 2007). Here, our 
significant group difference in the EF domain was largely driven by the poor performance of 
the ASD group on the generativity tasks (which support previous findings on generativity, 
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Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006; Bishop & Norbury, 2005b; Turner, 1999). 
Indeed, no single test from the CANTAB battery or the combined performance on the 
CANTAB tasks reached statistical significance, a finding that is not unusual in past 
CANTAB studies of ASD (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; 
Goldberg et al., 2005). One possible explanation lies in the computerised administration of 
the CANTAB; it has been proposed that a participant’s ability to infer the experimenter’s 
intentions may affect test performance in an experimenter-administered situation (see 
Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008; S. J. White, 2013), although Williams and 
Jarrold (2013) have recently published evidence to the contrary. Another possibility is that 
the verbal nature of the generativity tasks, rather than the EF properties, posed a problem for 
the children with ASD. 
Despite this, the combined EF measure still placed 29% of children with ASD in the 
bottom 5th centile of neurotypical performance, and significantly strengthened the group 
classification algorithm. Furthermore, the EF measure alone was able to correctly classify 
67% of children into the correct diagnostic groups, indicating that our 5th centile cut-off 
technique may have been overly conservative. An EF impairment certainly appears to be 
present in a substantial subgroup of individuals with autism therefore. 
The presence of an LB in autism has the weakest support both from the general autism 
literature (Happe & Frith, 2006) as well as from cross-domain studies (2 out of 5 studies, the 
present study included); even when significant effects are identified, it remains unclear 
whether these are mostly driven by an enhancement in local processing or a deficit in global 
processing. Our finding of a non-significant trend for enhanced local processing is certainly 
within the range of previous results. The lack of effect on the global processing task used 
here could be due to the choice of task and instructions given; it is possible that participants 
were able to identify the object by looking at a single piece rather than attempting to combine 
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the pieces. This possible pitfall could have been avoided by using the modified version of the 
task (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2001) where the combined picture cannot be interpreted from 
the fragments. Together, our tasks classified only 13% of the current sample of children as 
displaying an LB. If an LB is present in only a small subsample of the autistic population, 
this would go some way to explain the lack of group differences that are often reported in this 
domain. 
Cognitive fractionation 
Across the cognitive functions, measures were generally unrelated, most possible 
combinations of impairment were found in different children with ASD, and individual 
profiles revealed double dissociations between cognitive domains. While this generally paints 
a picture of cognitive fractionation in autism, we did find a strong relationship specifically 
between generativity and ToM performance on the Frith-Happé animations; ToM and EF 
also classified very similar sets of children into those with and without autism. It seems likely 
that these specific ToM and EF tests were related here either due to overlapping task 
demands (cf. verbal tasks and tasks requiring inference of the experimenter’s intentions) or 
because these two cognitive processes fundamentally rely on a common cognitive 
mechanism. Despite a lack of clarity as to the roots of this association, the past literature in 
ASD certainly supports the existence of such a relationship (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Zelazo, 2002).  
Cognition to behaviour 
To the best of our knowledge, only one study (Pellicano et al., 2006) has previously 
assessed correlations between multiple cognitive domains and symptomatology, and the few 
associations they found failed to survive correction for multiple comparisons. Even though 
we included multiple measures that probed behavioural symptomatology in different ways, 
associations between cognitive performance and behavioural symptomatology in the present 
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study were similarly sporadic and weak. Surprisingly, LB was the only domain that was 
correlated with symptomatology, being associated with less stereotypical behaviours on the 
ADOS and delay in spoken language without attempts to compensate through gestures on the 
ADI-R. These correlations were unexpected and did not survive Bonferroni correction. 
This lack of association across multiple methodologies and across two studies now, 
raises the question of the construct validity of the behavioural and cognitive test measures. 
While both clearly differentiate the autistic from the neurotypical group, it is possible that 
tests at either or both levels of representation are tapping into variance in some factor 
orthogonal to the one intended. Behavioural measures are intrinsically liable to the subjective 
opinion of the parent, teacher or experimenter, and the behaviours of interest are susceptible 
to being overshadowed by individual differences in intelligence, language, personality, 
education etc. Cognitive measures are likewise rarely pure measures of a single cognitive 
process. Recent work looking at more implicit cognitive measures (Schuwerk, Vuori, & 
Sodian, 2015; Senju, 2012; Sodian & Thoermer, 2008) holds promise for tapping more 
directly into the cognitive impairments underlying autism. 
 
In summary, our multi-domain study of cognition in autism indicated that difficulties 
on ToM and EF tasks characterise the majority of cases, raising the possibility that one or 
both may after all prove to be universal in autism given more sensitive cognitive measures. If 
so, this would counter the idea of ‘the autisms’ at least at the cognitive level and indicate that 
the spectrum should be approached as a unitary disorder. Our results also contribute to 
understanding fractionation in autism: ToM and EF were related, although the exact nature of 
this association has yet to be determined. ToM and EF were also the only variables to display 
clinical relevance, together distinguishing the vast majority of cases from controls, despite a 
lack of specific associations between cognitive and behavioural measures. While an LB 
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appears to be fractionated from ToM and EF, it was detected in only a few children and did 
not improve diagnostic classification, most likely contributing to non-diagnostic symptoms in 
a subgroup. Despite the characteristic heterogeneity of the autism spectrum, it remains a 
possibility therefore that a single cognitive cause may underlie the range of diagnostic 
symptoms in all individuals with autism. 
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Table 1: Participants characteristics; means (with standard deviations) 
 ASD group NTD group 
N (Male:Female) 31 (25:6) 37 (26:11) 
Age 10.98 (1.37) 10.87 (1.33) 
Performance IQ 102.06 (18.10) 108.59 (18.22) 
Verbal IQ 104.77 (13.94) 102.57 (16.30) 
Parents’ educational level 
(higher:lower) 
19:12 25:12 
SCQa, parents*** 16.74 (7.30) 3.09 (2.39) 
SCQb, teachers*** 12.81 (5.54) 6.83 (3.31) 
SRSc, parents*** 91.41 (30.99) 19.51 (12.09) 
SRSd, teachers*** 71.90 (28.22) 16.84 (13.04) 
ADOS total 9.90 (3.67) - 
ADI total 30.39 (14.26) - 
a N=31:33 
b N=27:23 
c N=29:33 
d N=20:26 
*** p<0.001 
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Table 2: Classification matrix for the discriminant function analysis, showing the percentage 
of correct classifications according to ToM and EF composite scores. 
  Predicted group 
  ASD NTD 
Actual group ASD 77.4% 22.6% 
NTD 18.9% 81.1% 
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Figure 1: The individual performance for both groups (ASD and NTD); each line represents 
one individual’s z-score on the given domain and the dotted lines indicates the bottom five 
per cent in the NTD group. Children in the ASD group below the dotted line were classified 
as “poor” performers. 
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Figure 2: Venn diagram to show the number of children with ASD who displayed significant 
ToM, LB or EF impairments; the 5 children outside the diagram represent those in which 
none of these impairments were detectable. 
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Figure 3: Profiles for children with ASD showing the presence of seven out of eight possible 
combinations of impairment and double dissociations between these three cognitive domains. 
 
 
